~ Thoughts on The Parsha ~
Parshas Korach
To Kill a Mockingbird: Dutch
Tulips and Mad Crowd Disease
By: Daniel Listhaus
וַיִּקַּח קֹרַח בֶּן יִצְהָר
בֶּן קְהָת בֶּן לֵוִי וְדָתָן וַאֲבִירָם בְּנֵי אֱלִיאָב וְאוֹן בֶּן פֶּלֶת
בְּנֵי רְאוּבֵן
““Korach son of
Yitzhar son of Kehas son of Levi seperated himself, with Dasan and Aviram, sons
of Eliav, and On son of Peles, sons of Reuvein.”
-Korach 16:1
Rashi[1]
and the Medrash[2]
describe that Korach came to Moshe with the following two questions. The first
was, “Does a tallis made entirely of techeiles (blue-dyed wool)
require a string of techeiles”? The logic behind this question is that
we know that we are required to put tzitzis strings on each corner of
every four-cornered garment that we wear.[3]
The real mitzva of tzitzis includes that one of the strings on
each corner be techeiles[4].
So, essentially, Korach was asking that if, for a regular tallis, a
single string of techeiles is enough to fulfill the requirement, then
certainly if the whole garment is made of techeiles, it should require
no such thing.
The
second question that Korach approached Moshe with was pretty similar to his
first; “Does a room filled with seforim need a mezuza?” Again,
the logical force behind this question is the following. We know that we must
put a mezuza, containing the shema, on every doorpost[5].
So, Korach was asking, if there is a room filled with seforim or Torahs,
and those have all the parshiyos in the Torah, why should such a
room require a mezuzah? What power would the mezuzah add which
would not already exist in such a room?
Rashi[6]
relates that Moshe responded that in both situations there is indeed still
an obligation. The mitzva of techeiles does not disappear if the
garment is already blue, and the mitzva of mezuza does not vanish
when the doorpost leads into a library of Sifrei Torah. Upon telling
this to Korach, Korach and the group which was with him began to laugh.
There
is a tremendous difficulty with the arguments which Korach presented. The
closest form of a valid logical-tool which Korach could have been trying to use
here is a kal v'chomer (fortiori argument). If so, Korach's question
should have answered itself. A kal v'chomer argument states that if
something applies in “situation A”, then it should certainly apply in
“situation B”, where it is even more likely to apply. According to this,
Korach's kal v'chomer should have said the following: If one string of techeiles
works to meet the requirement on a garment that is entirely white, then
certainly it will do the trick for a garment that is completely blue. After
all, it cannot be any worse than a white garment; it is at least the same, if
not better. The same is true of Korach's second kal v'chomer. If a
single mezuza on a doorpost to an empty room is enough to fulfill the mitzva,
then certainly it should work for a room filled with seforim.
The
answers to Korach's questions seem obvious. In fact, he supplied the answers
with his own kal v'chomers. Let us consider this for a moment. The
reason Korach had the audacity to confront Moshe with such pointless questions
is clearly because he was trying to make a point. However, why is it that when
Moshe responded to Korach with the correct answers, and seemingly refuted him,
Korach va'adaso (and his assembly) just stood there laughing?
The
theme of leitzanus (mockery) seems to continue further in the parsha as
well. The passuk[7]
relates that Korach gathered the entire assembly against Moshe and Aharon. Rashi[8]
describes that the way Korach managed this was through words of mockery. Korach
spent the night going from tent to tent with a prepared speech. He essentially
announced, “Do you think I am starting this argument just for my own sake? I am
doing this for all of you as well! Moshe and Aharon took all the greatest
positions for themselves. We have to stop them!”
Why
did Korach have to utilize leitzanus in order to accomplish his plan?
Why did he not simply challenge Moshe and Aharon to a formal debate?
In
the 17th Century, a fascinating event occurred known as the Dutch
Tulip Bubble. According to historians, Ogier de Busbecq of the Ottoman Empire
was the one who introduced the tulip to Europe in 1554, by sending tulip seeds
to Vienna. After a while, tulips began to spread across many European
countries. By 1619, tulips had become a commodity in
Holland and as the demand for tulips increased while more people entered the
tulip market, the prices kept rising to ridiculous heights. This continued
until February of 1637 when some tulips reached a price equivalent to between
$1000 and $2000 dollars. This was a price equal to about ten times the annual
income of a skilled craftsman in those days. At one point, people were too
afraid of planting their tulips because they were too expensive to risk.
This is not an example of some
European stupidity, nor is it a description of the naiveness of the 1600s.
Rather it is an illustration of how far crowd-behavior could go. Crowds tend to
behave irrationally. Just the feeling of being part of a greater group makes
one feel good, and causes him to care less about realities and truths he may
care about as an individual. The mental unity that a crowd or club has to offer
has a tremendous impact on personal opinions and beliefs. It changes people
from individuals and independent thinkers to being part of a crowd. One's
psyche is pushed aside and is instead replaced and shaped to the psychology of
the mob. This begins to snowball and ultimately, the “mad crowd disease”
spreads like wildfire. This is how a tulip could end up selling for such
exorbitant prices. If the crowd decides to attribute a false value to
something, the idea will begin to spread despite how ridiculous it may sound to
an individual who is outside the crowd.
Korach
had an agenda. He was jealous of Moshe and Aharon's positions. Until this point
their leadership was undisputed and Korach wanted to change that fact. However,
one man cannot influence an entire nation. Therefore, Korach used leitzanus (mockery)
as a means to unite the B'nei Yisroel against Moshe and Aharon. He
became the proverbial mockingbird poking fun at Moshe, and indeed succeeded in
getting the entire B'nei Yisroel in on the fun. The arguments of Korach
did not have to make sense, the only purpose of Korach's questions was to
publicly humiliate Moshe and start his own “mad crowd disease” to spread
throughout the B'nei Yisroel. The crowd psychology that Korach started
began to spread fast until Hashem ultimately came to stop it.
Rashi[9]
tells us that Dasan and Aviram joined Korach because they were his
neighbors. It should therefore not be surprising that they started playing the
same game. Moshe, in trying to seek peace with Korach tried to explain his
position, “Listen now, sons of Levi...You and your entire assembly who are
joining together are against Hashem! And as for Aharon – what is he that you
cause protest against him?”[10]
Moshe then tried to summon Dasan and Aviram to make peace, but he was met with
completely irrelevant opposition. They responded, “...You did not bring us to a
land flowing with milk and honey...even if you put out the eyes of those men we
shall not go up!” Dasan and Aviram were not addressing Moshe's attempt to seek
peace, they were not interested in doing anything but continue to fan the fire
of leitzanus which Korach had started. When Moshe realized this, the passuk[11]
and Rashi[12]
describe that Moshe was extremely upset and distressed.[13]
Like
their mentor, Korach, Dasan and Aviram did not address Moshe respectfully or
with any form of logic. Instead, they used leitzanus to push Moshe aside
in order to further their agenda.
The
mishna[14]
tells us, “Any dispute that is for the sake of Heaven will in the end
endure; but one that is not for the sake of Heaven will not endure.” The mishna
continues and explains, “Which is a dispute that is for the sake of Heaven?
This is the dispute between Hillel and Shammai.[15]
And which is a dispute that is not for the sake of Heaven? This is the dispute
of Korach and all of his assembly.”
This
mishna seems to be inconsistent. The first example of the mishna is
that a dispute between Hillel and Shammai is one which is for the sake of
Heaven. However, when discussing the argument of Korach, the mishna
refers to it as the dispute of Korach and his assembly. Why does it not refer
to it as the dispute between Korach and Moshe? Both parties of the argument
should be mentioned as the mishna did when discussing Hillel and
Shammai.
Perhaps
with our explanation we could understand this mishna. Korach's scheme
was not to argue with Moshe directly. He had no arguments. Even if he would
have had some logical argument, he would have had to deal with the fact that
Hashem was the One Who commanded Moshe who to choose for the various leading
positions of Klal Yisroel. Rather, Korach's idea was to change the psyche
of the B'nei Yisroel. It was a one-sided argument trying to use leitzanus
to create an army of mad crowd disease who would fight the fight for him.
This is the danger of the mockingbird, and the reason it is so necessary to
dispose of it.
Even
one who merely lives near one who is a rasha (wicked person) is
negatively affected by his neighbor's attitude, actions, and behavior. However,
it is not enough to not be a neighbor of such a person. Rather one must
disassociate oneself from even identifying with such crowds who are not arguing
to pursue the emes of Torah, but are instead trying to push their own
agendas contrary to da'as Torah.
With
this message in mind, may we merit to achieve the level of the first passuk in
Tehillim, “Praiseworthy is the man who did not walk in the counsel of
the wicked, and in the path of the sinful did not stand, and in the session of
mockers did not sit.”[16]
[1] Bamidbar 16:1
[2] Bamidbar Rabbah 18:1
[3] Bamidbar 15:38
[4]
A bluish dye made from a sea snail (chilazon)
[5] Excluding bathrooms
[6] Bamidbar 16:1
[7] Bamidbar 16:19
[8] Ibid.
[9] Bamidbar 16:1
[10] Bamidbar 16:11
[11] Bamidbar 16:15
[12] Ibid.
[13] See Amar N'kei on Rashi 16:15
[14] Avos 5:20
[15] Hillel and Shammai were a pair of early tannaim
in the mishnaic era. Their arguments were not out of anger, jealousy, or
haughtiness, but rather an argument over what the true halachos (laws)
in Torah are based on their mesorahs (tradition) and understandings.
[16] Tehillim 1:1
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