Parshas Korach - To Kill a Mockingbird: Dutch Tulips and Mad Crowd Disease

THoughts on Parsha
Parshas Korach

To Kill a Mockingbird: Dutch Tulips and Mad Crowd Disease

By: Daniel Listhaus

וַיִּקַּח קֹרַח בֶּן יִצְהָר בֶּן קְהָת בֶּן לֵוִי וְדָתָן וַאֲבִירָם בְּנֵי אֱלִיאָב וְאוֹן בֶּן פֶּלֶת בְּנֵי רְאוּבֵן

“And Korach the son of Yitzhar son of Kehas son of Levi took...”

-Korach 16:1

Rashi¹ and the Medrash² describe that Korach came to Moshe with the following two questions. The first was, “Does a tallis made entirely of techeiles (blue-dyed wool) require a string of techeiles”? The logic behind this question is that we know that we are required to put tzitzis strings on each corner of every four-cornered garment that we wear.³ The real mitzva of tzitzis includes that one of the strings on each corner be techeiles⁴. So, essentially, Korach was asking that if, for a regular tallis, a single string of techeiles is enough to fulfill the requirement, then certainly if the whole garment is made of techeiles, it should require no such thing.

The second question that Korach approached Moshe with was pretty similar to his first; “Does a room filled with seforim need a mezuza?” Again, the logical force behind this question is the following. We know that we must put a mezuza, containing the shema, on every doorpost⁵. So, Korach was asking, if there is a room filled with seforim or Torahs, and those have all the parshiyos in the Torah, why should such a room require a mezuzah? What power would the mezuzah be adding which would not already exist in such a room?

Rashi⁶ relates that Moshe responded that in both situations there is indeed still an obligation. The mitzva of techeiles does not disappear if the garment is already blue, and the mitzva of mezuza does not vanish when the doorpost leads into a library of Sifrei Torah. Upon telling this to Korach, Korach and the group which was with him began to laugh.

There is a tremendous difficulty with the arguments which Korach presented. The closest form of a valid logical-tool which Korach could have been trying to use here is a kal v'chomer (fortiori argument). If so, Korach's question should have answered itself. A kal v'chomer argument states that if something applies in “situation A”, then it should certainly apply in “situation B”, where it is even more likely to apply. According to this, Korach's kal v'chomer should have said the following: If one string of techeiles works to meet the requirement on a garment that is entirely white, then certainly it will do the trick for a garment that is completely blue. After all, it cannot be any worse than a white garment; it is at least the same, if not better. The same is true of Korach's second kal v'chomer. If a single mezuza on a doorpost to an empty room is enough to fulfill the mitzva, then certainly it should work for a room filled with seforim.

The answers to Korach's questions seem obvious. In fact, he supplied the answers with his own kal v'chomers. Let us consider this for a moment. The reason Korach had the audacity to confront Moshe with such pointless questions is clearly because he was trying to make a point. However, why is it that when Moshe responded to Korach with the correct answers, and seemingly refuted him, Korach va'adaso (and his assembly) just stood there laughing?

The theme of leitzanus (mockery) seems to continue further in the parsha as well. The passuk⁷ relates that Korach gathered the entire assembly against Moshe and Aharon. Rashi⁸ describes that the way Korach managed this was through words of mockery. Korach spent the night going from tent to tent with a prepared speech. He essentially announced, “Do you think I am starting this argument just for my own sake? I am doing this for all of you as well! Moshe and Aharon took all the greatest positions for themselves. We have to stop them!”

Why did Korach have to utilize leitzanus in order to accomplish his plan? Why did he not simply challenge Moshe and Aharon to a formal debate?

In the 17^th Century, a fascinating event occurred known as the Dutch Tulip Bubble. According to historians, Ogier de Busbecq of the Ottoman Empire was the one who introduced the tulip to Europe in 1554, by sending tulip seeds to Vienna. After a while, tulips began to spread across many European countries. By 1619, tulips had become a commodity in Holland and as the demand for tulips increased while more people entered the tulip market, the prices kept rising to ridiculous heights. This continued until February of 1637 when some tulips reached a price equivalent to between $1000 and $2000 dollars. This was a price equal to about ten times the annual income of a skilled craftsman in those days. At one point, people were too afraid of planting their tulips because they were too expensive to risk.

This is not an example of some European stupidity, nor is it a description of the naiveness of the 1600s. Rather it is an illustration of how far crowd-behavior could go. Crowds tend to behave irrationally. Just the feeling of being part of a greater group makes one feel good, and causes him to care less about realities and truths he may care about as an individual. The mental unity that a crowd or club has to offer has a tremendous impact on personal opinions and beliefs. It changes people from individuals and independent thinkers to being part of a crowd. One's psyche is pushed aside and is instead replaced and shaped to the psychology of the mob. This begins to snowball and ultimately, the “mad crowd disease” spreads like wildfire. This is how a tulip could end up selling for such exorbitant prices. If the crowd decides to attribute a false value to something, the idea will begin to spread despite how ridiculous it may sound to an individual who is outside the crowd.

Korach had an agenda. He was jealous of Moshe and Aharon's positions. Until this point their leadership was undisputed and Korach wanted to change that fact. However, one man cannot influence an entire nation. Therefore, Korach used leitzanus (mockery) as a means to unite the B'nei Yisroel against Moshe and Aharon. He became the proverbial mockingbird poking fun at Moshe, and indeed succeeded in getting the entire B'nei Yisroel in on the fun. The arguments of Korach did not have to make sense, the only purpose of Korach's questions was to publicly humiliate Moshe and start his own “mad crowd disease” to spread throughout the B'nei Yisroel. The crowd psychology that Korach started began to spread fast until Hashem ultimately came to stop it.

Rashi⁹ tells us that Dasan and Aviram joined Korach because they were his neighbors. It should therefore not be surprising that they started playing the same game. Moshe, in trying to seek peace with Korach tried to explain his position, “Listen now, sons of Levi...You and your entire assembly who are joining together are against Hashem! And as for Aharon – what is he that you cause protest against him?”¹⁰ Moshe then tried to summon Dasan and Aviram to make peace, but he was met with completely irrelevant opposition. They responded, “...You did not bring us to a land flowing with milk and honey...even if you put out the eyes of those men we shall not go up!” Dasan and Aviram were not addressing Moshe's attempt to seek peace, they were not interested in doing anything but continue to fan the fire of leitzanus which Korach had started. When Moshe realized this, the passuk¹¹ and Rashi¹² describe that Moshe was extremely upset and distressed.¹³

Like their mentor, Korach, Dasan and Aviram did not address Moshe respectfully or with any form of logic. Instead, they used leitzanus to push Moshe aside in order to further their agenda.

The mishna¹⁴ tells us, “Any dispute that is for the sake of Heaven will in the end endure; but one that is not for the sake of Heaven will not endure.” The mishna continues and explains, “Which is a dispute that is for the sake of Heaven? This is the dispute between Hillel and Shammai.¹⁵ And which is a dispute that is not for the sake of Heaven? This is the dispute of Korach and all of his assembly.”

This mishna seems to be inconsistent. The first example of the mishna is that a dispute between Hillel and Shammai is one which is for the sake of Heaven. However, when discussing the argument of Korach, the mishna refers to it as the dispute of Korach and his assembly. Why does it not refer to it as the dispute between Korach and Moshe? Both parties of the argument should be mentioned as the mishna did when discussing Hillel and Shammai.

Perhaps with our explanation we could understand this mishna. Korach's scheme was not to argue with Moshe directly. He had no arguments. Even if he would have had some logical argument, he would have had to deal with the fact that Hashem was the One Who commanded Moshe who to choose for the various leading positions of Klal Yisroel. Rather, Korach's idea was to change the psyche of the B'nei Yisroel. It was a one-sided argument trying to use leitzanus to create an army of mad crowd disease who would fight the fight for him. This is the danger of the mockingbird, and the reason it is so necessary to dispose of it.

Even one who merely lives near one who is a rasha (wicked person) is negatively affected by his neighbor's attitude, actions, and behavior. However, it is not enough to not be a neighbor of such a person. Rather one must disassociate oneself from even identifying with such crowds who are not arguing to pursue the emes of Torah, but are instead trying to push their own agendas contrary to da'as Torah.

With this message in mind, may we merit to achieve the level of the first passuk in Tehillim, “Praiseworthy is the man who did not walk in the counsel of the wicked, and in the path of the sinful did not stand, and in the session of mockers did not sit.”

1Bamidbar 16:1

2Bamidbar Rabbah 18:1

3Bamidbar 15:38

4 A bluish dye made from a sea snail (chilazon)

5Excluding bathrooms

6Bamidbar 16:1

7Bamidbar 16:19

8Ibid.

9Bamidbar 16:1

10Bamidbar 16:11

11Bamidbar 16:15

12Ibid.

13See Amar N'kei on Rashi 16:15

14Avos 5:20

15Hillel and Shammai were a pair of early tannaim in the mishnaic era. Their arguments were not out of anger, jealousy, or haughtiness, but rather an argument over what the true halachos (laws) in Torah are based on their mesorahs (tradition) and understandings.

Photo Credit: http://thaumazein-albert.blogspot.com/2011/05/dutch-tulips.html