Friday, November 22, 2013

Parshas Vayeishev - For Heaven's Sake: 50-50 = 80-20

Parshas Vayeishev




For Heaven's Sake:
50-50 = 80-20
By: Daniel Listhaus

וַיַּכֵּר יְהוּדָה וַיֹּאמֶר צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי כִּי עַל כֵּן לֹא נְתַתִּיהָ לְשֵׁלָה בְנִי וְלֹא יָסַף עוֹד לְדַעְתָּהּ

Yehuda recognized; and he said, 'She is right; it is from me, inasmuch as I did not giver her to Sheilah my son,' and he did not continue to be intimate with her anymore.”
-Vayeishev 38:26


Throughout the Torah, there are many examples of seemingly horrible things that people – even tzadikkim (righteous people) have done, which were claimed wholeheartedly to have been done completely l'sheim shamayim (literally: for Heaven's [Hashem's] sake). Many of these events and actions resulted in tremendous world-changing consequences.1 In this week's parsha too there are a few famous examples.

The parsha opens with a look into, what appears to be, the dysfunctional house of Yaakov avinu. Yosef would tattle-tale on his brothers,2 Yaakov loved Yosef and showed his affection openly by giving him more than his brothers,3 and Yosef did things that would instigate his brothers' anger – such as telling them his dreams.4 As we know, this three-way relationship complex was just the exciting start of the lives of B'nei Yisroel which caries through the end of sefer Beraishis. However, let us look at some of the events in this week's parsha for some examples of people doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and people who did the wrong thing for the right reason.

The story of the brothers throwing Yosef into the pit is something which is beyond our comprehension. They were not average people with typical sibling rivalry, Rather they were mature tzadikkim who were collectively destined to father the Jewish Nation. Yosef was already in is upper teen years at the time and the shevatim involved in throwing him into the pit (all of them besides for Binyamin) were all older than him. The Torah5 describes that originally the brothers actually wanted to kill Yosef, but Reuvein heard saved Yosef by suggesting that they just throw him into a pit. After they did so, the Torah tells us that the brothers did not regret their actions one iota. In fact, they sat down to eat. The S'forno6 points this out explicitly, that the brothers were so sure that they were doing the right thing that it did not bother them to have wanted to kill Yosef, because they felt that was the correct thing to do, and it certainly did not bother them to throw him into a pit of scorpions and snakes. After all, they deemed Yosef to be a rodeif (killer) and it was their obligation to see to it that he be killed first before any damage was done. The brothers formed a beis din, and with certainty they sentenced Yosef to death.
Clearly here we have an example of the shevatim doing a completely wrong thing but seemingly with only good intentions. They were not trying to do anything against halacha (law). Rather, they really felt with a clean conscience that killing Yosef was the right thing to do.

As aforementioned, Reuvein talked the brothers out of it and suggested that merely throwing Yosef into a pit would accomplish their goal just the same. The brothers acquiesced and they threw Yosef into a pit of snakes and scorpions. However, the insight that Rashi gives us into the thought process of Reuvein is quite interesting. Rashi7 writes that Reuvein said to himself the following: “I am the firstborn and the most prominent among all the brothers. The foulness will be hung upon none but me.” We would have thought that Reuvein perhaps realized their mistake but knew he would not be able to convince the brothers to change their minds completely so instead he suggested this less extreme alternative and figured he would be able to save Yosef later by rescuing him from the pit. However, Rashi seems to describe Reuvein's thoughts as him being more concerned for getting the brunt of the blame later on, than he was of Yosef's well-being. Here we have an example of someone doing a good thing but with not as good intentions.

There is a Gemara8 which quotes a fascinating statement by R' Nachman bar Yitzchak: Doing an aveira (sin) l'shmah (with the right intentions for the sake of Hashem) is greater than doing a mitzva she'lo l'shmah (for one's own sake, not for the sake of Hashem). The Gemara asks on this: how can such a statement be true? After all, there is a famous concept of “mee'toch she'lo l'shmah, ba l'shmah”. This literally means that if one involves oneself in doing mitzvos, even for the wrong reasons, such as out of selfishness or ulterior motives, one will eventually come to do the mitzvos for the right reason.

The truth is though that even this question needs to be qualified. R' Eliyahu Dessler, in his sefer Michtav Me'Eliyahu9, explains that mitzvos could be performed on a variety of levels. The highest level is doing a mitzva purely l'shmah – solely because Hashem commanded to do the mitzva and you want to carry out the word of Hashem. The level under that is doing a mitzva she'lo l'shmah but with a small spark inside you that you want to do things for the right reason. This itself could take many forms. Some of us may do things for the wrong reasons but wish we could do it like someone else who we recognize does things with the correct intentions. Some of us do things but wish secretly inside that we be able to do it for the right reasons and not just go with the flow. And for others perhaps it is a sense of guilt that comes afterwards when we realize that we used a mitzva for selfish reasons or to boost ourselves. However, on this level there is still hope and that little spark – whether it is to want to do good or to want to want to do good – is all that is needed for chazal to be confident to say “keep doing what you are doing because what you are doing she'lo l'shma now will ultimately lead to doing mitzvos l'shmah and retroactively, it will have all been worth it.” However, the lowest level of performing a mitzva is one who does a mitzva without even this miniscule 'nekudas l'shma'. Such a mitzva is not a mitzva in the eyes of Hashem and the person's actions, although they look good, are not good at all and nothing good will come of it.

Going back to the Gemara, the Gemara's question seems like a good one. How could it even enter one's mind to say that doing an aveira l'shmah is better than a mitzva she'lo l'shma? First, in one case you are doing a mitzva and in the other you are doing an aveirah? Second, a mitzva she'lo l'shmah could lead to a mitzva l'shmah, as we see from R' Dessler's explanation, but it would seem that someone doing an aveirah l'shma is hopeless. Such a person thinks he is doing completely the right thing with only good intentions in mind! So how could it be that an aveirah l'shmah be better than a mitzva she'lo l'shma?

The Gemara's answer though is just as surprising as its hava amina (original premise). The Gemara answers, granted, of course an aveirah l'shmah is not greater than a mitzva she'lo l'shma; but it is not less either, they are equal! The Gemara's answer is difficult to understand. How could they be equal? Being equal implies that they are equidistant from doing the purely correct thing and that it would take similar efforts to correct the mistake and reach higher. How could we comprehend this?

The Chovos Ha'levavos10 writes that there are really two elements to doing mitzvos. One factor is what he terms the chovos ha'eivarim (literally: duties of the limbs)referring to the physical obligations we have to do: Put on tefillin, place a mezuzah on our doorposts, eat matza, shake lulav, etc. The second factor is what he calls the chovos ha'levavos (the duties of the heart) – referring to the necessity to do things with the right intentions in mind. Are you shaking the lulav because you do not want to look like an outcast in shul and really you are secretly thinking that it is one of the weirdest things you have ever done and wasted your money on? Or are you shaking the lulav because you appreciate the value of carrying out a mitzva – a direct commandment from Hashem – and whether you are on the level of understanding the purpose or not you will do it with a smile on your face? Often times we are challenged with this expression of Pareto's principle. Pareto's principle, more commonly known as the 80-20 rule, states that in many cases, 80% of effects come from 20% of their causes. This principle has been applied to many aspects of life from peas coming from pea pods to wealth distribution in a given economy. Similarly, when it comes to mitzvos, one could go through the motions of purchasing tefillin, lulav, and mezuzos and be sure to use them appropriately at their respective times and in their respective ways. However, it is the intention – that remaining 20% which is missing which is such a vital element of the mitzva and will no doubt require 80% of the effort, in terms of working on oneself to do the mitzva fully.

If we stop for a moment and analyze what an aveirah l'shmah is, we will find that it is exactly the opposite. In such a case, the person has accomplished the mindset and intention aspect (i.e. - the chovos ha'levavos), but is lacking on doing the correct course of action (i.e. - the chovos ha'eivarim). In this scenario too the person has worked hard and developed his ahavas (love for) and yiras (fear of) Hashem, but it is the last 20% - in his case the doing the right actions – which will take 80% of his effort to somehow convince himself that what he thinks he is doing for the right reasons is in fact the wrong thing to do.

Perhaps we could now understand how in a sense doing a mitzva she'lo l'shma and an aveirah l'shmah are equidistant from doing the perfect mitzva l'shma. However, although we could understand the path one must take to go from mitzva she'lo l'shma to mitzva l'shmah, how is it that one goes from doing aveiros l'shma to doing mitzvos l'shmah?

Later on in the parsha, we find the episode of Yehuda and Tamar; a story which is very hard to comprehend. However, leaving aside the reasons and intentions for a moment, the structure of the story is that Yehuda was told that Tamar (Yehuda's daughter in law, the wife of his dead son) was pregnant. Yehuda, not realizing that it was he who made her pregnant, responded she is subject to the death penalty of s'reifah (burning).11 The Torah tells us that as she was being taken out to be burned, she sent a package to Yehuda with his signet, wrap, and staff in it with a message that she had become pregnant by the person who the objects had belonged to. Rashi12 explains that Tamar did not want to declare explicitly that she had become pregnant from Yehuda because she did not want to embarrass him publicly.13 Yehuda had the choice to play dumb and pretend he had no idea who the objects belonged to, but to his incredible credit, he stepped forward and exclaimed, “tzadkah me'meh'nee”; admitting two things: One, that Tamar was righteous and two, that the pregnancy was from him.14

Perhaps it is this expression which is the answer as to how one fixes a position of doing aveiros l'shma. When it comes to correcting mitzvos she'lo l'shma, our task is to work on our ahavas and yiras Hashem; but when it comes to correcting aveiros l'shma those elements are already there. Instead, in such a case our job is to stop and be completely honest with ourselves if our actions are really lining up properly with our thoughts and intentions, or if there is an outside factor with is obscuring our vision and making aveiros look like mitzvos.

Challenges come in many different forms. Sometimes we are challenged with mitzvos which are easy to do in practice, but hard to do for the right reasons, and other times we are faced with aveiros which look to us like mitzvos and we already have the proper intentions and want to go forward full force in doing the aveirah. The trick is to stop, think, and identify each scenario in order to understand the approach that must be taken. Is it an area which needs chizuk (strengthening) of emunah in Hashem and a love for His mitzvos, or is it an area which requires an intellectually honest analysis.

May Hashem help us accomplish the two halves of every mitzva – the chovos ha'eivarim element as well as the chovos ha'levavos aspect, and help us be honest with ourselves in order to identify which part is our “80” and which is our “20” so that we could all achieve the purest level of doing mitzvos l'shmah.



1For example, see Beraishis 19:30-38 and Rashi there.
2See Beraishis 37:2 and Rashi there.
3See Beraishis 37:3 and Rashi there.
4Beraishis 37:5, 37:9, and 37:10
5Beraishis 37:20
6S'forno Beraishis 37:25
7Rashi Beraishis 37:22
8Nazir 23b
9See Michtav Me'Eliyahu cheilek gimmel pg. 115, 118, and 334 (pages may vary by edition)
10See Hakdama (introduction) to Chovos Halevavos by Rabbi Bachya ibn Pakuda.
11See Rashi Beraishis 38:24
12Rashi Beraishis 38:25
13See Gemara Sotah 10b

14See Rashi and Ramban Beraishis 38:26

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