Parshas
Vayeishev
For
Heaven's Sake:
50-50
= 80-20
By:
Daniel Listhaus
וַיַּכֵּר
יְהוּדָה וַיֹּאמֶר צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי
כִּי עַל כֵּן לֹא נְתַתִּיהָ לְשֵׁלָה
בְנִי וְלֹא יָסַף עוֹד לְדַעְתָּהּ
“Yehuda
recognized; and he said, 'She is right; it is from me, inasmuch as I
did not giver her to Sheilah my son,' and he did not continue to be
intimate with her anymore.”
-Vayeishev
38:26
Throughout
the Torah, there are many examples of seemingly horrible things that
people – even tzadikkim
(righteous
people) –
have done, which were claimed wholeheartedly to have been done
completely l'sheim
shamayim (literally:
for Heaven's [Hashem's] sake). Many of these events and actions
resulted in tremendous world-changing consequences.1
In this week's parsha
too
there are a few famous examples.
The
parsha
opens
with a look into, what appears to be, the dysfunctional house of
Yaakov avinu.
Yosef would tattle-tale on his brothers,2
Yaakov loved Yosef and showed his affection openly by giving him more
than his brothers,3
and Yosef did things that would instigate his brothers' anger –
such as telling them his dreams.4
As we know, this three-way relationship complex was just the exciting
start of the lives of B'nei
Yisroel which
caries through the end of sefer
Beraishis.
However, let us look at some of the events in this week's parsha
for some examples of people doing the right thing for the wrong
reason, and people who did the wrong thing for the right reason.
The
story of the brothers throwing Yosef into the pit is something which
is beyond our comprehension. They were not average people with
typical sibling rivalry, Rather they were mature tzadikkim
who were collectively destined to father the Jewish Nation. Yosef was
already in is upper teen years at the time and the shevatim
involved
in throwing him into the pit (all of them besides for Binyamin) were
all older than him. The Torah5
describes that originally the brothers actually wanted to kill Yosef,
but Reuvein heard saved Yosef by suggesting that they just throw him
into a pit. After they did so, the Torah tells us that the brothers
did not regret their actions one iota. In fact, they sat down to eat.
The S'forno6
points this out explicitly, that the brothers were so sure that they
were doing the right thing that it did not bother them to have wanted
to kill Yosef, because they felt that was the correct thing to do,
and it certainly did not bother them to throw him into a pit of
scorpions and snakes. After all, they deemed Yosef to be a rodeif
(killer)
and it was their obligation to see to it that he be killed first
before any damage was done. The brothers formed a beis
din,
and
with certainty they sentenced Yosef to death.
Clearly
here we have an example of the shevatim
doing
a completely wrong thing but seemingly with only good intentions.
They were not trying to do anything against halacha
(law).
Rather, they really felt with a clean conscience that killing Yosef
was the right thing to do.
As
aforementioned, Reuvein talked the brothers out of it and suggested
that merely throwing Yosef into a pit would accomplish their goal
just the same. The brothers acquiesced and they threw Yosef into a
pit of snakes and scorpions. However, the insight that Rashi
gives
us into the thought process of Reuvein is quite interesting. Rashi7
writes that Reuvein said to himself the following: “I am the
firstborn and the most prominent among all the brothers. The foulness
will be hung upon none but me.” We would have thought that Reuvein
perhaps realized their mistake but knew he would not be able to
convince the brothers to change their minds completely so instead he
suggested this less extreme alternative and figured he would be able
to save Yosef later by rescuing him from the pit. However, Rashi
seems
to describe Reuvein's thoughts as him being more concerned for
getting the brunt of the blame later on, than he was of Yosef's
well-being. Here we have an example of someone doing a good thing but
with not as good intentions.
There
is a Gemara8
which
quotes a fascinating statement by R' Nachman bar Yitzchak: Doing an
aveira
(sin)
l'shmah
(with
the right intentions for the sake of Hashem) is greater than doing a
mitzva
she'lo l'shmah (for
one's own sake, not for the sake of Hashem). The Gemara
asks
on this: how can such a statement be true? After all, there is a
famous concept of “mee'toch
she'lo l'shmah, ba l'shmah”.
This literally means that if one involves oneself in doing mitzvos,
even for the wrong reasons, such as out of selfishness or ulterior
motives, one will eventually come to do the mitzvos
for
the right reason.
The
truth is though that even this question needs to be qualified. R'
Eliyahu Dessler, in his sefer
Michtav
Me'Eliyahu9,
explains
that mitzvos
could
be performed on a variety of levels. The highest level is doing a
mitzva
purely
l'shmah
– solely
because Hashem commanded to do the mitzva
and
you want to carry out the word of Hashem. The level under that is
doing a mitzva
she'lo l'shmah but
with a small spark inside you that you want to do things for the
right reason. This itself could take many forms. Some of us may do
things for the wrong reasons but wish we could do it like someone
else who we recognize does things with the correct intentions. Some
of us do things but wish secretly inside that we be able to do it
for the right reasons and not just go with the flow. And for others
perhaps it is a sense of guilt that comes afterwards when we realize
that we used a
mitzva for
selfish reasons or to boost ourselves. However,
on this level there is still hope and that little spark – whether
it is to want to do good or to want to want to do good – is all
that is needed for chazal
to be confident to say “keep doing what you are doing because what
you are doing
she'lo l'shma now
will ultimately lead to doing mitzvos
l'shmah and
retroactively, it will have all been worth it.” However, the lowest
level of performing a mitzva
is
one who does a mitzva
without
even this miniscule 'nekudas
l'shma'.
Such a mitzva
is
not a mitzva
in
the eyes of Hashem and the person's actions, although they look good,
are not good at all and nothing good will come of it.
Going
back to the Gemara,
the Gemara's
question
seems like a good one. How could it even enter one's mind to say that
doing an aveira
l'shmah is
better than a mitzva
she'lo l'shma?
First, in one case you are doing a mitzva and
in the other you are doing an aveirah?
Second, a mitzva she'lo l'shmah could
lead to a mitzva l'shmah,
as we see from R' Dessler's explanation, but it would seem that
someone doing an aveirah l'shma is
hopeless. Such a person thinks he is doing completely the right thing
with only good intentions in mind! So how could it be that an aveirah
l'shmah be better than a mitzva
she'lo l'shma?
The
Gemara's answer though
is just as surprising as its hava amina (original
premise). The Gemara answers,
granted, of course an aveirah l'shmah is
not greater than a mitzva she'lo l'shma;
but it is not less either, they are equal! The Gemara's
answer is difficult to
understand. How could they be equal? Being equal implies that they
are equidistant from doing the purely correct thing and that it would
take similar efforts to correct the mistake and reach higher. How
could we comprehend this?
The
Chovos Ha'levavos10
writes that there are really two
elements to doing mitzvos.
One factor is what he terms the chovos ha'eivarim
(literally: duties of the limbs)
– referring to the physical
obligations we have to do: Put on tefillin,
place a mezuzah on our
doorposts, eat matza,
shake lulav, etc. The
second factor is what he calls the chovos ha'levavos (the
duties of the heart) – referring to the necessity to do things with
the right intentions in mind. Are you shaking the lulav
because you do not want to look
like an outcast in shul
and really you are secretly thinking that it is one of the weirdest
things you have ever done and wasted your money on? Or are you
shaking the lulav because
you appreciate the value of carrying out a mitzva – a
direct commandment from Hashem – and whether you are on the level
of understanding the purpose or not you will do it with a smile on
your face? Often times we are challenged with this expression of
Pareto's principle. Pareto's principle, more commonly known as the
80-20 rule, states that in many cases, 80% of effects come from 20%
of their causes. This principle has been applied to many aspects of
life from peas coming from pea pods to wealth distribution in a given
economy. Similarly, when it comes to mitzvos,
one could go through the motions of purchasing tefillin,
lulav, and mezuzos
and be sure to use them
appropriately at their respective times and in their respective ways.
However, it is the intention – that remaining 20% which is missing
which is such a vital element of the mitzva and
will no doubt require 80% of the effort, in terms of working on
oneself to do the mitzva fully.
If
we stop for a moment and analyze what an aveirah l'shmah
is, we will find that it is
exactly the opposite. In such a case, the person has accomplished the
mindset and intention aspect (i.e. - the chovos
ha'levavos), but is lacking on
doing the correct course of action (i.e. - the chovos
ha'eivarim). In this scenario
too the person has worked hard and developed his ahavas
(love for) and
yiras (fear of)
Hashem, but it is the last 20% -
in his case the doing the right actions – which will take 80% of
his effort to somehow convince himself that what he thinks he is
doing for the right reasons is in fact the wrong thing to do.
Perhaps
we could now understand how in a sense doing a mitzva
she'lo l'shma and an aveirah
l'shmah are equidistant from
doing the perfect mitzva l'shma.
However, although we could understand the path one must take to go
from mitzva she'lo l'shma to
mitzva l'shmah, how is
it that one goes from doing aveiros l'shma to
doing mitzvos l'shmah?
Later
on in the parsha, we
find the episode of Yehuda and Tamar; a story which is very hard to
comprehend. However, leaving aside the reasons and intentions for a
moment, the structure of the story is that Yehuda was told that Tamar
(Yehuda's daughter in law, the wife of his dead son) was pregnant.
Yehuda, not realizing that it was he who made her pregnant, responded
she is subject to the death penalty of s'reifah (burning).11
The Torah tells us that as she was being taken out to be burned, she
sent a package to Yehuda with his signet, wrap, and staff in it with
a message that she had become pregnant by the person who the objects
had belonged to. Rashi12
explains that Tamar did not want
to declare explicitly that she had become pregnant from Yehuda
because she did not want to embarrass him publicly.13
Yehuda had the choice to play dumb and pretend he had no idea who the
objects belonged to, but to his incredible credit, he stepped forward
and exclaimed, “tzadkah me'meh'nee”;
admitting two things: One, that Tamar was righteous and two, that the
pregnancy was from him.14
Perhaps
it is this expression which is the answer as to how one fixes a
position of doing aveiros l'shma.
When it comes to correcting mitzvos she'lo l'shma,
our task is to work on our ahavas and
yiras Hashem; but when
it comes to correcting aveiros l'shma
those elements are already there. Instead, in such a case our job is
to stop and be completely honest with ourselves if our actions are
really lining up properly with our thoughts and intentions, or if
there is an outside factor with is obscuring our vision and making
aveiros look like
mitzvos.
Challenges
come in many different forms. Sometimes we are challenged with
mitzvos which are easy
to do in practice, but hard to do for the right reasons, and other
times we are faced with aveiros which
look to us like mitzvos and
we already have the proper intentions and want to go forward full
force in doing the aveirah.
The trick is to stop, think, and identify each scenario in order to
understand the approach that must be taken. Is it an area which needs
chizuk (strengthening)
of emunah in Hashem
and a love for His mitzvos,
or is it an area which requires an intellectually honest analysis.
May
Hashem help us accomplish the two halves of every mitzva
– the chovos ha'eivarim element
as well as the chovos ha'levavos
aspect, and help us be honest with ourselves in order to identify
which part is our “80” and which is our “20” so that we could
all achieve the purest level of doing mitzvos l'shmah.
1For
example, see Beraishis 19:30-38
and Rashi there.
2See
Beraishis 37:2 and
Rashi there.
3See
Beraishis 37:3 and Rashi
there.
4Beraishis
37:5, 37:9, and 37:10
5Beraishis
37:20
6S'forno
Beraishis 37:25
7Rashi
Beraishis 37:22
8Nazir
23b
9See
Michtav Me'Eliyahu cheilek gimmel pg.
115, 118, and 334 (pages may vary by edition)
10See
Hakdama (introduction) to
Chovos Halevavos by
Rabbi Bachya ibn Pakuda.
11See
Rashi Beraishis 38:24
12Rashi
Beraishis 38:25
13See
Gemara Sotah 10b
14See
Rashi and Ramban
Beraishis 38:26
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