Parshas
Re'eh
Baseless
Beliefs
By: Daniel Listhaus
אֵת
כָּל הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה
אֶתְכֶם אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לֹא
תֹסֵף עָלָיו וְלֹא תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ
“The
entire matter that I command you, you shall guard it to do; you shall
not add to it and you shall not subtract from it.”
-Re'eh 13:1
Rashi1
explains that when the Torah
here commands us not to add to the mitzvos,
it means that we are prohibited from adding to the mitzvos
themselves, such as bringing a
fifth species on Succos
with the lulav or
adding in a fourth beracha (blessing)
to birkas kohanim (the
blessing that the kohanim
give which is divided into three parts). Presumably we could assume
that Rashi would
similarly explain that when the passuk (verse)
says not to subtract from the mitzvos it
means not to, for example, bring three species on Succos or recite
only two berachos of
birkas kohanim.
The
question we must ask, though, is what compelled Rashi to
explain the passuk in
this way? Certainly a more obvious explanation of the Torah would be
that Hashem gave us 613 mitzvos and
we are not allowed to add or subtract from those mitzvos?
The words of the passuk sound
like they are talking to the person who wants to stand up and declare
a new mitzva which
would benefit society, to which the Torah is telling him that it is
forbidden to add mitzvos. So, why does Rashi explain
the passuk as not
adding or subtracting to the details of each particular mitzva?
The
S'forno2
also seems
to understand the passuk slightly
differently. When the Torah writes not to add to the mitzvos,
the S'forno comments,
“Do not add to the mitzvos because
perhaps you will be adding something which is disgusting in the eyes
of Hashem. For example, perhaps you may decide to add a new form of
worshiping Hashem such as burning children, which is disgusting in
the eyes of Hashem.”
This
S'forno seems a bit
extreme. He is explaining that the Torah was afraid of people making
up their own ways to serve Hashem – such as burning children in
fire. Is this really a concern? The S'forno is
not dealing with someone looking to serve avodah zarah
(idols), but rather a regular
orthodox Jew looking for more ways to serve Hashem. What would be so
bad with someone choosing to serve Hashem in his own personal way?
Also how is the S'forno addressing
this by taking it to an extreme?
The
S'forno continues to
explain that when the Torah says not to subtract from the mitzvos
it means the following.
Sometimes a person could look at a particular mitzva and
say that the reason for the mitzva is
not applicable and therefore the mitzva is
no longer necessary. Sometimes such a claim is general – that the
mitzva as a whole no
longer applies, and sometimes it is a claim that an individual could
make for himself, that for whatever reason the reason behind the
mitzva does not apply
to him and therefore he is exempt from the mitzva.
The
S'forno continues to
mention that this was precisely the mistake that Shlomo
HaMelech made. The passuk3
states, regarding a Jewish king,
“And he shall not have too many wives,4
and his heart shall not turn astray...” The Medrash5
describes that Shlomo learned this passuk and
figured that it did not apply to him. After all, the passuk
seems to be saying that the
reason a king cannot have too many wives is because the Torah is
concerned that it will cause his heart to go astray. Shlomo thought
that because of his gift of abundant wisdom he was different from
everyone else and therefore felt he could go ahead and marry
additional wives.6
However, as the S'forno writes,
this was a big mistake. The Torah forbids us from subtracting mitzvos
even if it seems to us that the
reason is not applicable.
This
S'forno is also
difficult to understand. Shlomo HaMelech read
the Torah and its reason for not having too many wives. He made a
personal calculation that it was not relevant to him and acted upon
that feeling. What did he do wrong? The S'forno is
saying that even if we see that the reason does not apply anymore, we
should do it anyway. Why? If in fact the reason does not apply, what
is the point of playing along and keeping unnecessary restrictions?
If the S'forno would
say that there is an external reason why one should keep the mitzva,
such as not to confuse others to
think the mitzva is
completely non-existent, or in order that others should not think
that such a person is specifically revolting against Hashem, then we
could perhaps understand why it would be important to do a mitzva,
despite its non-applicable reason. However, the S'forno
does not give these answers as
the explanation, but rather simply writes that even if it appears
that the reason for the mitzva does
not apply to you, you must do it anyway. Why is that so?
Imagine
you were to walk into an ethics class at a university and are
immediately swept into a series of thought provoking and interesting
questions. You sit in the back and listen as the professor presents a
famous question known as the Trolley Problem. There are many versions
of the question but the basic gist is the following: There is a
trolley out of control speeding down the tracks. Ahead on the tracks
lay five people who are tied down, unable to move out of the way. You
happen to be standing on the side of the tracks next to a lever. If
you were to pull the lever, the trolly would be redirected onto a
different set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person
laying tied down on that track as well. Therefore, the two options
are to either do nothing and allow the trolly to continue its course
and kill the five people, or pull the lever and divert the trolly
onto the other set of tracks where it will only kill the one person.
The professor then turns to his class and challenges them: which
option do you choose? As you remain observing in the back, you begin
to witness the most fascinating debate amongst the students. One
person stands up and declares that it is so obvious that you need to
pull the lever. After all, how could you allow the five people to die
for the sake of a single individual. Suddenly another member of the
class jumps up and shouts back, “You mean you think it is better to
actively kill someone? Better to just let nature take its course and
allow the five people to die than for it to be on your hands that you
actively killed the single person on the other track.” Another
classmate then stands up and says, “Well I think it should matter
who these people are. Perhaps the five people are anyways all sick
and elderly people, while the individual on the track happens to be a
baby.” Another student then stands up emotionally charged and says,
“What difference should it make? Who are you to play the role of
God? Maybe the healthy guy will die tomorrow and the sick, elderly
people will live until 120!”
As
your head is bouncing back and forth digesting the various arguments
and interjections by the professor pointing out the various defined
schools of thought, you wonder to yourself what are all these ethics
based on? The first student who stood up made a valid point: One
should do what is best for the majority. However, without a doubt if
you were to ask him why, he would have nothing to respond other than,
“Because that is the correct thing to do. It is something that just
feels right.” With this approach it is important to keep in mind
that if one believes that a moral code is just based on gut feeling
and emotions, then one has to be ready to accept the moral code of
others based on their personal feelings and emotions. The response of
“it just feels right” is arbitrary. Who says that what you think
feels right is in fact right? For example, imagine someone who
believes that if there is something a person wants for himself, he is
ethically permitted to go any distance to get what he wants. Such a
person could argue that if someone else has something he is jealous
of and wants it, he has the right to demand it from him; and if he
refuses, he could even kill for the item he desires. If one were to
challenge this person and ask why such a mentality makes sense, he
too could respond, “Because it is honestly just something that
feels right to me. I was put in this world and it is my job to do
whatever it takes to make myself happy.” Despite the two very
different approaches to life, these two people have the same reason
why they do what they do. Their response is incontestable and could
be used by anyone to rationalize any action.
One of the things we
have to think about everyday is the fact that not only must we be
grateful to Hashem for creating us, and not only must we thank Him
for creating us as humans, we must also thank Him for the fact that
He, as Creator of the world did not leave us here alone.7
He gave us the Torah. The Torah is more than a history book, more
than a scroll of rules, and more fundamental than a perspective on
life. It is insight into Hashem Himself. Just like in order to
optimize a board game, one must read the instruction pamphlet, so too
when it comes to knowing how to live, think, and even things as
personal as how to feel emotionally, the only way to act and respond
correctly is through understanding what Hashem wants from us. This
could only be done by someone who is close to Hashem, which is only
possible by someone who has spent the time learning His Torah.
It is known that there
are two categories of mitzvos
– mishpatim and
chukim.
Mishpatim refer
to the mitzvos
which
are easy for us to understand. For example, not to steal or kill are
things which are obvious to us that they should not be done. Chukim
refer
to the mitzvos
which
we cannot begin to fully comprehend. The whole concept of tumah
(impurity)
and tahara
(purity)
and especially the details within those concept such as parah
adumah are
more than just complex. They are ideas that are way beyond us.
However,
despite this difference between the two terms, it is important to
keep in mind that in reality every single mitzva
is
a chok (singular
for chukim).
Even the mitzvos
which
make sense to us and we think we comprehend, are not things that we
should do solely because they make sense to us, nor are they right or
wrong based on our personal understanding or emotions. Rather things
are only good or bad because Hashem declared them as such. For
example, the fact that killing is wrong is not just because it feels
wrong, rather it is because Hashem declared it as wrong. However, if
there would be a time that the Torah would demand someone or a nation
to be killed, whether we understand the reason or not, and whether we
personally believe that death is deserved or not is completely
irrelevant. Everything has its time and place. The person who studies
the ways of Hashem through His Torah shel
b'chsav (written
Torah) and Torah shel
ba'al
peh
understands on a much deeper level what makes things right and wrong
using the tools of reason that Hashem gave us on Har
Sinai
to use.
Perhaps
now we could better appreciate Rashi
and
the S'forno's
explanations
on the passuk of
not adding or subtracting to the Torah. As mentioned above, Rashi
gave examples as to what the Torah means when it says that one could
not add to the Torah. He wrote that one cannot add another species to
the lulav,
esrog,
haddas
and aravah,
or add in a beracha
to
birkas kohanim.
Perhaps Rashi
chose
this explanation as opposed to simply writing that the Torah gave 613
mitzvos and
we cannot add to that number because that would not be completely
true. Part of the Torah's system is to leave room for those in-tuned
to what Hashem wants to be able to create safety precautions to
protect the Torah or create other decrees as they see fit.
The
S'forno too
is coming to explain that the Torah is teaching us the following.
Even if someone thinks that the thing he is adding is enhancing his
avodas Hashem,
do not do it without consulting someone who has insight into the ways
of Hashem, for perhaps he will be doing something disgusting in the
eyes of Hashem such as burning children. The S'forno
is
not exaggerating, he is simply stating a fact. Indeed one who makes
up way of serving Hashem, no matter how good it seems in his eyes, it
is repulsive to Hashem. If it does not have roots in the Torah then
it is completely baseless like the person who sacrifices children.
Although you may think that the two are not even comparable, you must
keep in mind that if you are willing to argue that what you feel is
good avodas
Hashem is valid, then you are also saying that whatever anyone else
feels is good avodas
Hashem
is valid as well. And yes, that baseless argument could rationalize
anything – even the burning of children.
One
cannot make up mitzvos
based
on what he feels is right and wrong. In the end of the day unless one
is in-tuned to da'as
elyon by
thoroughly studying the Torah to the point that one is trained to
think, so to speak, like Hashem, one has no right to declare what is
good or bad. One cannot just say that because he feels something is
right that therefore it must be the case. For, just like the trolly
problem, every s'vara
(logic)
one way will have a counter s'vara
against
it by someone else does not share the same feelings and therefore
ends up with a completely different moral code. Rather, when it comes
to the Torah we must keep in mind that even the mitzvos
we
think we know the reason for, we really do not and at some level
every mitzva we
do – even those as basic as not killing or being nice to one
another – is a chok,
a decree from Hashem. This was Shlomo's mistake. He saw that the
Torah specified a reason for why a king should not marry too many
wives and he took that at face value.
As
we enter into the month of Elul,
may Hashem help us realize that His telling us in the Torah what to
do and not to do is the only reason that anything becomes inherently
good or evil, and that alone is the only solid base for a belief
system with a valid moral code. With this in mind we will be zoche
(merit)
to a real teshuva
(repentance)
and
a complete kapparah
(atonement).
1Devarim
13:1
2Ibid.
3Devarim
17:17
4See
Gemara Sanhedrin 21a. A king
cannot marry more than 18 wives.
5Shemos
Rabbah 6:1
6He
married 1000 wives!
7See
Orchos Tzadikkim: Sha'ar HaZechira
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