Thoughts on The Parsha
Parshas Re'eh
Baseless Beliefs
By: Daniel Listhaus
אֵת כָּל הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר
אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לֹא תֹסֵף עָלָיו וְלֹא
תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ
“The entire matter that I
command you, you shall guard it to do; you shall not add to it and you shall
not subtract from it.”
-Re'eh 13:1
Rashi[1]
explains that when the Torah here commands us not to add to the mitzvos,
it means that we are prohibited from adding to the details of the mitzvos themselves,
such as bringing a fifth species on Succos with the lulav or
adding in a fourth beracha (blessing) to birkas kohanim (the
blessing that the kohanim give which is divided into three parts).
Presumably we could assume that Rashi would similarly explain that when
the passuk (verse) says not to subtract from the mitzvos it means
not to, for example, bring three species on Succos or recite only two berachos
of birkas kohanim.
The
question we must ask, though, is what compelled Rashi to explain the passuk
in this way? Certainly a more obvious explanation of the Torah would be
that Hashem gave us 613 mitzvos and we are not allowed to add or
subtract from those mitzvos? The words of the passuk sound like
they are talking to the person who wants to stand up and declare a new mitzva
which would benefit society, to which the Torah is telling him that it is
forbidden to add mitzvos. So, why does Rashi explain the passuk as
not adding or subtracting to the details of each particular mitzva?
The
S'forno[2]
also does not seem to understand the passuk at face value.
Rather, when the Torah writes not to add to the mitzvos, the S'forno comments,
“Do not add to the mitzvos because perhaps you will be adding something
which is disgusting in the eyes of Hashem. For example, perhaps you may decide
to add a new form of worshiping Hashem such as burning children, which is
disgusting in the eyes of Hashem.”
This
S'forno seems a bit extreme. He is explaining that the Torah was afraid
of people making up their own ways to serve Hashem – such as burning children
in fire. Is this really a concern? The S'forno is not dealing with
someone looking to serve avodah zarah (idols), but rather an orthodox
Jew abiding to the 613 mitzvos but just not feeling it is enough so adds
a 614th mitzvah. What would be so bad with someone choosing
to serve Hashem in his own personal way? How is the S'forno addressing
this by taking it to an extreme?
The
S'forno continues to explain that when the Torah says not to subtract
from the mitzvos it means the following. Sometimes a person could look
at a particular mitzva and say that the reason for the mitzva is
not applicable and therefore the mitzva is no longer necessary.
Sometimes such a claim is general – that the mitzva as a whole no longer
applies, and sometimes it is a claim that an individual could make for himself,
that for whatever reason the reason behind the mitzva does not apply to
him and therefore he is exempt from the mitzva.
The
S'forno continues to mention that this was precisely the mistake that
Shlomo HaMelech made. The passuk[3]
states, regarding a Jewish king, “And he shall not have too many wives,[4]
and his heart shall not turn astray...” The Medrash[5]
describes that Shlomo learned this passuk and figured that it did not
apply to him. After all, the passuk seems to be saying that the reason a
king cannot have too many wives is because the Torah is concerned that it will
cause his heart to go astray. Shlomo thought that because of his gift of
abundant wisdom he was different from everyone else and therefore felt he could
go ahead and marry additional wives.[6]
However, as the S'forno writes, this was a big mistake. The Torah
forbids us from subtracting mitzvos even if it seems to us that the
reason is not applicable.
This
S'forno is also difficult to understand. Shlomo HaMelech read the
Torah and its reason for not having too many wives. He made a personal
calculation that it was not relevant to him and acted upon that feeling. What
did he do wrong? The S'forno is saying that even if we see that the
reason does not apply anymore, we should do it anyway. Why? If in fact the
reason does not apply, what is the point of playing along and keeping
unnecessary restrictions? If the S'forno would say that there is an
external reason why one should keep the mitzva, such as not to
confuse others to think the mitzva is completely non-existent, or in
order that others should not think that such a person is specifically revolting
against Hashem, then we could perhaps understand why it would be important to
do a mitzva, despite its non-applicable reason. However, the S'forno does
not give these answers as the explanation, but rather simply writes that even
if it appears that the reason for the mitzva does not apply to you, you
must do it anyway. Why is that so?
In
order to approach this, let us take a moment to think about the following. Imagine
you were to walk into an ethics class at a university and are immediately swept
into a series of thought provoking and interesting questions. You sit in the
back and listen as the professor presents a famous question known as the
Trolley Problem. There are many versions of the question but the basic gist is
the following: There is a trolley out of control speeding down the tracks.
Ahead on the tracks lay five people who are tied down, unable to move out of
the way. You happen to be standing on the side of the tracks next to a lever.
If you were to pull the lever, the trolley would be redirected onto a different
set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person lying tied down on
that track as well. Therefore, the two options you have are to either do nothing
and allow the trolley to continue its course and kill the five people, or pull
the lever and divert the trolley onto the other set of tracks where it will
only kill the one person. The professor then turns to his class and challenges
them: which option do you choose? As you remain observing in the back, you
begin to witness the most fascinating debate amongst the students. One person
stands up and declares that it is so obvious that you need to pull the lever.
After all, how could you allow the five people to die for the sake of a single
individual. Suddenly another member of the class jumps up and shouts back, “You
mean you think it is better to actively kill someone? Better to just let nature
take its course and allow the five people to die than for it to be on your
hands that you actively killed the single person on the other track.” Another
classmate then stands up and says, “Well I think it should matter who these
people are. Perhaps the five people are anyways all sick and elderly people,
while the individual on the track happens to be a baby.” Another student then
stands up emotionally charged and says, “What difference should it make? Who
are you to play the role of God? Maybe the healthy guy will die tomorrow and
the sick, elderly people will live until 120!”
As
your head is bouncing back and forth digesting the various arguments and
interjections by the professor pointing out the various defined schools of
thought, you wonder to yourself what are all these ethics based on? The first
student who stood up made a valid point: One should do what is best for the
majority. However, without a doubt if you were to ask him why, he would have
nothing to respond other than, “Because that is the correct thing to do. It is
something that just feels right.” With this approach it is important to keep in
mind that if one believes that a moral code is just based on gut feeling and
emotions, then one has to be ready to accept the moral code of others based on
their personal feelings and emotions. The response of “it just feels right” is
arbitrary. Who says that what you think feels right is in fact right? For
example, imagine someone who believes that if there is something a person wants
for himself, he is ethically permitted to go any distance to get what he wants.
Such a person could argue that if someone else has something he is jealous of
and wants it, he has the right to demand it from him; and if he refuses, he
could even kill for the item he desires. If one were to challenge this person
and ask why such a mentality makes sense, he too could respond, “Because it is
honestly just something that feels right to me. I was put in this world and it
is my job to do whatever it takes to make myself happy.” Despite the two very
different approaches to life, these two people have the same reason why they do
what they do. Their response is incontestable and could be used by anyone to
rationalize any action.
One
of the things we have to think about everyday is the fact that not only must we
be grateful to Hashem for creating us, and not only must we thank Him for
creating us as humans, we must also thank Him for the fact that He, as Creator
of the world did not leave us here alone.[7]
He gave us the Torah. The Torah is more than a history book, more than a scroll
of rules, and more fundamental than a perspective on life. It is insight into
Hashem Himself. Just like in order to optimize a board game, one must read the
instruction pamphlet, so too when it comes to knowing how to live, think, and
even things as personal as how to feel emotionally, the only way to act and
respond correctly is through understanding what Hashem wants from us. This
could only be done by someone who is close to Hashem, which is only possible by
someone who has spent the time learning His Torah.
It
is known that there are two categories of mitzvos – mishpatim and
chukim. Mishpatim refer to the mitzvos which are easy for
us to understand. For example, not to steal or kill are things which are
obvious to us that they should not be done. Chukim refer to the mitzvos
which we cannot begin to fully comprehend. The whole concept of tumah (impurity)
and tahara (purity) and especially the applications of chukim
such as parah adumah are more than just complex - they are ideas that
are way incomprehensible to us.
However,
despite this difference between the two terms, it is important to keep in mind
that in reality every single mitzva is a chok (singular for chukim).
Even the mitzvos which make sense to us and we think we comprehend, are
not things that we should do solely because they make sense to us, nor are they
right or wrong based on our personal understanding or emotions. Rather things
are only good or bad because Hashem declared them as such. For example, the
fact that killing is wrong is not just because it feels wrong, rather it is
because Hashem declared it as wrong. However, if there would be a time that the
Torah would demand someone or a nation to be killed, whether we understand the
reason or not, and whether we personally believe that death is deserved or not
is completely irrelevant. Everything has its time and place. The person who
studies the ways of Hashem through His Torah shel b'chsav (written
Torah) and Torah shel ba'al peh understands on a much
deeper level what makes things right and wrong using the tools of reason that
Hashem gave us on Har Sinai to use.
Perhaps
now we could better appreciate Rashi and the S'forno's explanations
on the passuk of not adding or subtracting to the Torah. As mentioned
above, Rashi gave examples as to what the Torah means when it says that
one could not add to the Torah. He wrote that one cannot add another species to
the lulav, esrog, haddas and aravah, or add in a beracha
to birkas kohanim. Perhaps Rashi chose this explanation as
opposed to simply writing that the Torah gave 613 mitzvos and we cannot
add to that number because that would not be completely true. Part of the
Torah's system is to leave room for those in-tuned to what Hashem wants to be
able to create safety precautions to protect the Torah or create other decrees
as they see fit.
The
S'forno too is coming to explain that the Torah is teaching us the
following. Even if someone thinks that the thing he is adding is enhancing his avodas
Hashem, do not do it without consulting someone who has insight into the
ways of Hashem, for perhaps he will be doing something disgusting in the eyes
of Hashem such as burning children. The S'forno is not exaggerating; he
is simply stating a fact. Indeed one who makes up way of serving Hashem, no
matter how good it seems in his eyes, it is repulsive to Hashem. If it does not
have roots in the Torah then it is completely baseless like the person who
sacrifices children. Although you may think that the two are not even
comparable, you must keep in mind that if you are willing to argue that what
you feel is good avodas Hashem is valid, then you are also saying that
whatever anyone else feels is good avodas Hashem is valid as well. And
yes, that baseless argument could rationalize anything – even the burning of
children.
One
cannot make up mitzvos based on what he feels is right and wrong. In the
end of the day unless one is in-tuned to da'as elyon by thoroughly
studying the Torah to the point that one is trained to think, so to speak, like
Hashem, one has no right to declare what is good or bad. One cannot just say
that because he feels something is right that therefore it must be the case.
For, just like the trolly problem, every s'vara (logic) one way will
have a counter s'vara against it by someone else who does not share the
same feelings and therefore ends up with a completely different moral code.
Rather, when it comes to the Torah we must keep in mind that even the mitzvos
we think we know the reason for, we really do not and at some level every mitzva
we do – even those as basic as not killing or being nice to one another –
is a chok, a decree from Hashem. This was Shlomo's mistake. He saw that
the Torah specified a reason for why a king should not marry too many wives and
he took that at face value.
As
we enter into the month of Elul, may Hashem help us realize that His
telling us in the Torah what to do and not to do is the only reason that
anything becomes inherently good or evil, and that alone is the only solid base
for a belief system with a valid moral code. With this in mind we will be zoche
(merit) to a real teshuva (repentance) and a complete kapparah
(atonement).
[1] Devarim 13:1
[2] Ibid.
[3] Devarim 17:17
[4] See Gemara Sanhedrin 21a. A king cannot marry more than 18 wives.
[5] Shemos Rabbah 6:1
[6] He married 1000 wives!
[7] See Orchos Tzadikkim: Sha'ar HaZechira
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