Parshas Ki Seitzei - Partners in Crime

~ Thoughts on the Parsha ~

Parshas Ki Seitzei

Partners in Crime

By: Daniel Listhaus

לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּכִיסְךָ אֶבֶן וָאָבֶן גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה: לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּבֵיתְךָ אֵיפָה וְאֵיפָה גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה: אֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה וָצֶדֶק יִהְיֶה לָּךְ אֵיפָה שְׁלֵמָה וָצֶדֶק יִהְיֶה לָּךְ לְמַעַן יַאֲרִיכוּ יָמֶיךָ עַל הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר ה' אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ: כִּי תוֹעֲבַת ה' אֱלֹקיךָ כָּל עֹשֵׂה אֵלֶּה כֹּל עֹשֵׂה עָוֶל

“You shall not have in your pouch a stone and a stone – a large one and a small one. You shall not have in your house a measure and a measure – a large one and a small one. A complete [perfect] and honest stone shall you have, a complete [perfect] and honest measure shall you have, so that your days shall be lengthened on the land that Hashem, your G-d, gives you. For an abomination of Hashem, your G-d, are all who do this, all who act fraudulently.”

-Ki Seitzei 25:13-16

            As is most of Sefer Devarim^[1], this mitzva is a reiteration of what was commanded earlier in the Torah.^[2] The requirement for a person to make sure that one's scales are accurate is a mitzva which is fundamental in the Torah because it represents the necessary honesty and truth which must be exhibited at all times.

            The Kli Yakar^[3] is bothered that if one takes a closer look at these passukim (verses), one will notice a technical difficulty. What does the Torah mean by “a large stone” and “a small stone”? Our first thought may be to think that they represent measures which would result in giving too much or too little merchandise. The Torah would then be describing a dishonest person who, when taking things for himself uses the large stone, yet when measuring for others uses the small stone. However, this cannot be the right explanation because it does not fit well in the passuk. When the Torah writes what one should have instead of these two stones, it says, “A complete [perfect] and honest stone shall you have...”.^[4] The passuk counters the small stone by stating that one must have a full one, but does not seem to directly address the over-sized measurement by advising to instead get a smaller one of normal size. Why is this so?

            Based on this question, it must be that there is a slightly different explanation and perhaps a deeper message being taught here in the Torah. The Kli Yakar explains as follows. Although when the Torah writes here “a small stone” it does indeed refer to one which measures less than it should, the “large stone” which is mentioned does not reflect this same idea to refer to a measure more than it is supposed to be. Instead, when the Torah describes the “large stone” it means a perfectly accurate stone. The Torah only used the adjective “large” in order to compare and contrast it to the fraudulent small one.

            The obvious problem with this is, as the Kli Yakar himself points out, why does the Torah command that such a stone should not be found in one's possession? The Torah should instead have said, “You should not have in your pouch a small stone, rather you should only have a large one.” Furthermore, after stating this negative commandment, the Torah^[5] strengthens it by saying that this is considered an abomination to Hashem. Why should Hashem despise those who carry accurate measures?

            The Kli Yakar answers these questions in the following way. Shlomo HaMelech writes in Mishlei^[6], “A stone and a stone, a measure and a measure, also both of them are abominations to Hashem”. The word “also” (“gam”) seems to be extra. Why not just write “both of them...”? Based on this the Kli Yakar explains that the two stones/measures that Shlomo refers to are not both dishonest. Rather, one is small and the other is accurate, and yet Shlomo is coming to teach us that even the one which is the right measure is an abomination. The reason for this is because having the correct stone creates a situation which allows one to be deceitful by accrediting the small one. After all, imagine if this store owner would only have his small measure. He could take his chances, but every time he dares to cheat someone, he will be worried that people will realize and take him to Beis Din (Jewish court). In such a case he will be found guilty and suffer the consequences. However, with an accurate measure in his pocket as well, which he could use for some of his customers, a fail-proof scheme is formed. Now if someone were to go home and discover he was given less than he should have gotten and  try to take the dishonest person to Beis Din, this person would be able to confidently go to Beis Din and call in those for who he always measured correctly to swear in his defense. The result would be that Beis Din would assume that the person claiming to have been cheated is indeed the real cheater and that his own weights are the ones which are imprecise.

            Immediately after this commandment not to have inaccurate measures, the Torah charges us to never forget what Amalek did to us when we came out of Mtzrayim. They attacked us when we were vulnerable and we cannot forgive them of this. Rashi^[7] comments that the juxtaposition between these two seemingly unconnected topics is coming to communicate the following message. If we are untruthful about our measures and weights, then we should begin worrying about getting attacked by our enemies.

            The Kli Yakar is very bothered by this Rashi. First, what does being dishonest have to do with our enemies attacking us? We know that Hashem punishes middah k'neged middah (measure for measure), so why is having our enemies attack us considered a fit punishment for cheating our customers? Furthermore, when Amalek attacked us there were certainly no cases yet of people with fraudulent measures, so this explanation does not even work well with the first time Amalek waged war against us. How could we understand this Rashi?

            The Kli Yakar continues and says that with the aforementioned idea we developed, we could now have a better appreciation for this juxtaposition that Rashi is coming to address. The person who has the accurate measuring stone together with the under-sized one is trying to secretly deceive his customers. He is one who is lacking yiras shamayim (fear of Heaven), for he does not consider the fact that Hashem is omniscient. Rather, he thinks that Hashem will be tricked with his scheme along with the Beis Din. A person with such a mentality deserves to be attacked by Amalek – who attack publicly at times when we are lax in our yiras shamayim.^[8]

            The yesod (foundation, main point) of this Kli Yakar is one which is an important one to internalize. Even though the accurate stone is nothing more than a passive player in a plot to harm others, it is still considered as much an abomination as the stone specifically designed to cheat. Keeping quiet while a friend is doing something wrong, or being a silent partner in a crime, still makes one a responsible party in what occurred. We must be careful not just to make sure that we are not the dishonest stone, but to even make sure that we do not place ourselves as the accurate measure in an environment which, with its presence, sheker could be enhanced.

            The opposite is also true. Earlier in this week's parsha, the Torah relates some exceptions as to who is allowed to convert to Judaism.^[9] Among these passukim, the Torah^[10] says, “You shall not hate an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not abhor an Egyptian for you were a sojourner in his land. Children who are born to them in the third generation may enter the congregation of Hashem.” At face value, this passuk is extremely difficult to understand. We are commanded to not show hatred toward Egyptians nor prevent them from converting to Judaism because we are forever indebted to them; after all, we stayed in their land. What exactly do we owe them for? The price we paid for staying in Mitzrayim was not worth the value we received. We were forced into hard, purposeless labor, they tried to kill our children by drowning them in the Nile, and even after we finally left Mitzrayim they chased after us! Yet, despite all this, we are expected to allow them to convert to Judaism after three generations? For what do we owe this favor? Rashi^[11] on this passuk comments that although all these facts are true and we were indeed treated miserably by the Egyptians, nevertheless because they were a source of help during our time of need when there was a famine in Eretz Yisroel and the shevatim came to Mitzrayim for food, we are indebted to them.

            This Rashi does not make the passuk any easier to understand. No time in history did the Ancient Egyptians intend to do anything nice for the Jews. Hashem had a plan to get B'nei Yisroel down to Mitzrayim. Therefore, Hashem created a famine everywhere except for Egypt which had seven plentiful years and had stored silos of food. The Egyptian government's full intention was to become fabulously wealthy using the advise that Yosef HaTzadik gave them. Yet, even though they were nothing more than a proverbial pawn in Hashem's master plan, still, because we benefited from dwelling there, we must hold back our hatred and allow them to convert to Judaism if they wish.^[12]

            We see here a very similar concept as we saw in the Kli Yakar. It does not matter how passive a part one may play in an overall plan. If one causes goodness to come from him, no matter how indirect, it will be attributed back to him. The same, however, is true in the opposite scenario. Even someone as complete and perfect as the accurate stone, but who is lacking in yiras shamayim and plays even the smallest role in contributing to bring aveiros into the world, is responsible for those ramifications.

            As difficult as it may be for a person to become a “perfect stone” in the first place, that still cannot be our ultimate goal. The Orchos Tzadikkim^[13] offers the following moshol. A person may work hard to fill his barrel with wine, but as long as there is a hole in the barrel, it will all leak out. The same is true when it comes to people. One may even be on the level to realize that gashmiyus (materialism) is not what is important, and such a person may fill his barrel with Torah and chesed. However, as long as there is a lack in yiras shamayim, there are holes in the barrel and it will all leak out.

            The trickster in our parsha has a perfect stone. However, because it just sits silently as a deceitful scheme evolves around it, it too is an abomination in Hashem's eyes. As mentioned, though, the opposite holds true as well. One who is the cause of chesed, even if it be indirectly, is owed a sense of gratitude for being there in a time of need. Imagine if we actually make an effort to encourage people or actively help others to achieve, how much more so will we be rewarded!

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[1]    This is in fact why Sefer Devarim is also called Mishna Torah – because it is a repeat of many of the Torah.

[2]    Vayikra 19:35

[3]    Devarim 25:13

[4]    Devarim 25:14

[5]    Devarim 25:16

[6]    Mishlei 20:10

[7]    Devarim 25:17

[8]    See Rashi on Shemos 17:8

[9]    Devarim 23:4

[10]  Devarim 23:8-9

[11]  Devarim 23:8

[12]  See Sifri Devarim 252 (23:8-9)

[13]  In the Hakdama (Introduction) to the sefer.

Parshas Shoftim - A Seemingly Untraditional Tradition

~ Thoughts on the Parsha ~

Parshas Shoftim

A Seemingly Untraditional Tradition

By: Daniel Listhaus

עַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ וְעַל הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ תַּעֲשֶׂה לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל

“According to the teaching that they will teach you and according to the judgement that they will say to you shall you do; you shall not turn from the word that they will tell you, right or left.”

-Shoftim 17:11

            Rashi[1] comments that this passuk (verse) teaches us that even if one’s Rov (Rabbi) says about right that it is left and about left that it is right we are obligated to abide by his ruling. From the fact that Rashi is describing the Torah’s commandment as “Listen to the Rabbis even if he says to you about right that it is left”, is an indication that we are not just dealing with someone who knows nothing and is asking a Rabbi for a halachik ruling, rather it seems that we are dealing with someone who knows his “rights and lefts” and yet the Torah is telling him that if he goes to ask a halachik shailah (question), he must listen to the Rov’s answer even if what he is telling you seems completely backwards.[2] Imagine the following scene: There is a person who knows a thing or two about halacha and Torah values but comes up with a question which, although he has a general picture of what the answer should be, he is not 100 percent sure. So he goes to his Rov and asks a shailah. After providing all the necessary details to his Rov, the Rov thinks and responds with an answer which is totally out of the blue and in the opinion of the asker, is clearly incorrect. As he listens to the response with his jaw dropped open he thinks to himself, “It seems to be contrary to basic halacha! How could that be kosher, it is so obviously treif? Or how could that be mutar (permitted), it is so clear that it is assur (forbidden)?” Yet, the torah tells us to follow the rulings of the Rabbis even if they tell us about right that it is left and left that it is right.

This commandment is difficult to understand. If it is in fact so clear that what the Rov is ruling does not follow halacha, then how could it be that we are commanded to listen? And on the flip-slide, if a Rabbi indeed has the power to switch around the laws as he sees fit why can’t he decide to cancel Shabbos, end keeping kosher, and eat on Yom Kippur?

            The world view of Judaism is quite naïve. After all, the world at large has an unsophisticated view of religion in general. Many people see life as one big game. A person enters by choosing a religion which will provide a meaning to life, a system of rules, motivation, spirituality, and some level of structure. After all Pascal’s wager states that a rational person should live as though God exists and seek to believe in God. If God does not actually exist, such a person will have only a finite loss in this world with minor restrictions, whereas if He does the possibility is there for an afterlife of infinite pleasures or sufferings. Each religion of course must offer incentives[3] which promise some sort of fabulous after-life providing one kept to the rules of the religion; and it goes without saying that each religion believes about the other that it is total nonsense and that they are in for a rude awakening when they die.

            Imagine a person born on an abandoned island with absolutely no opinion or religious view[4] who is brought before a panel of representatives of every religion. This person knowing nothing but logic and math will figure that mathematically it is worth the “gamble” to be a religious person. Then he will look at each religion and see that each has the same probability of being true and that numbers of followers does not at all necessarily portray the accuracy of the religion’s claims. So, this thinking person would make his decision based on two factors: The demands and the potential rewards. After all, if there is a religion out there with very few demands and a great reward why wouldn’t he choose that one if it has the same chance of being right as any other religion? After choosing a religion, this person may even be inclined to try to recruit others, and this could be for any number of reasons depending on the religion. In some cases, the religion itself demands it. In others, it may not but the members feel the need to share with others what they found works for themselves. And in some cases, neither of those reasons applies but the members may feel better being part of a bigger crowd so they reach out to others to join.

            However, as religious Jews we have the privilege of having an informed perspective of Judaism specifically. We do not see a game of probabilities nor merely a world with laws, but rather a world created and conducted by Hashem and fully operating based on His Torah. There is no doubt that Judaism is by far the most complex, detailed, and demanding religion. It is almost ironic that any other religion calls us infidels or blasphemers for just “leaving out” so little compared to all that we are already doing so well. Some religions do not eat pig, but everyone knows which religion has the highest level of kashrus. Some religions are very into repentance, but only one has the experience of Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, slichos, shofar, and significant fast days throughout the year.

A major part of Judaism’s complexity lies within the fact that despite the truth that we are the only religion to claim that millions of people directly heard Hashem reveal Himself on Har Sinai and that we received the Torah from Hashem and directly passed down this mesorah (tradition) from generation to generation until today, still every single halacha brought in Shulchan Aruch has a whole story behind it. Which mitzvah is it a part of? How was it learned out? What were the related disputes? Why did our mesorah choose to branch down one way to get the final ruling and not an alternative way? So much thought and proofs went into our mesorah since Har Sinai – always following the guidelines set forth by Hashem in His written and oral Torahs. A glimpse of this could be seen in the recorded Gemara we still learn today but the infinite wisdom that exists behind the scenes is unfathomable.

The gemara[5] comments that it is precisely this complexity which may turn people away. Besides for the fact that the laws themselves are numerous and a challenge to keep to perfection, the fact that everything is disputed makes it hard for a layman to take seriously. After all, if one Rabbi tells me I can’t turn on a light on Shabbos because it creates a circuit and another Rabbi tells me that I cannot turn it on because it is considered making a fire, why can’t I just cancel the reasons out and turn it on? If there is a dispute as to if a particular mixture is deemed kosher or not, why can’t I just choose what I want with the justification that there is a Rabbi out there that would hypothetically permit it? The gemara asks this but offers only a cryptic answer that “all of Torah was given over to Moshe to teach us”. How could we understand this gemara? How could we clarify and become educated in our understanding as to how something wrong could be right and something right could be wrong?

The Kli Yakar[6] explains as follows. The Torah and its laws are from Hashem and it deals with reality from Hashem’s perspective. Hashem gave us His Torah to guide us through this world and live effectively. The Torah is from Hashem and the tools given to man in order to understand His Torah are from Hashem, and nothing is simple. The Orchos Tzaddikim writes an entire sefer on the middos (traits) which make up human behavior and how to channel them appropriately. As the sefer repeats many times, besides for each middah having a polar opposite,  for example haughtiness and humility, it is equally important to understand that there is “good haughtiness” and “bad haughtiness” and that “good haughtiness” is not even haughtiness at all but in fact humility. Standing up to people who are against Hashem, or taking care of oneself are really acts of humility as they demonstrates understanding one’s place as an eved Hashem. The same is true when it comes to halachos. Tamei (impure) items, for example, have a facet of taharah (purity) to them; and vice versa. It is just that the overwhelming aspects of a tamei item screams out tamei while the majority of aspects of a tahor item calls out tahor. However, a shift in the equation by adding variables such as curveball situations or added details to a particular case could in fact shift the dominant view of the tamei item to become tahor, or a kosher item to be treif.

The integration of the right ingredients to add to the mix in order to come to the accurate p’sak (ruling) is not for the faint of heart. It takes a deep understanding of our mesorah as well as the tools and guidelines handed over by Hashem to B’nei Yisroel to understand and apply the Torah’s principles. This is the meaning of the gemara[7] which states that the members of Sanhedrin had to know how to purify a sheretz (a tamei creeping creature) according to the Torah; not by finding “legal loopholes”, but rather by understanding the facets of everything and comprehending which variables are able to change their balances and which cannot. There is an incredible amount of responsibility and power given over to every proper beis din with qualified dayanim (judges) k’das Moshe v’Yisroel to understand the halachos with the associated reasons, proofs, details, and logic in order to properly pinpoint if the thing that is in question which looks like tamei, sounds like tamei, and smells like tamei is really tamei or if its aspect of tahara has its moment to shine and what looks right is suddenly left and what looks left is suddenly right. Not because of legal loop holes, not because beis din is confused, and not because they have the authority to flip-flop, but rather because we have an “untraditional tradition” which is more complex than a set of rules because it is a description of Hashem’s ratzon which by definition is reality and sometimes reality calls the act of killing as being merciful even though it looks cruel, sometimes calls giving tzedaka unkind even though it looks nice. It all depends on the factors and details of the particular case based on the tools and guidelines transmitted in our rich mesorah as well as the da’as Torah perspective of the leading Torah authorities of each generation.

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[1] Devarim 17:11

[2] See Ohr Hachaim 17:9 who says that although the Rov does not have to offer his reasoning on his own, if one asks, he must say. It would see that one can discuss why the Rov decided what he ruled as he did but the final word is based on the Rov’s da’as Torah.  

[3] Note: Not all incentives are created equal. Some “offer” physical pleasures in an afterlife, some “offer” more of an escape from punishment, while others “offer” a chance to come back in another form.

[4] Note: Being born on an island without influence of religion does not mean that one cannot achieve it on his own. After all, Avraham avinu recognized that there must be Hashem – Who not only created the world, but continues to create it and intimately control it.

[5] Chagiga 3b

[6] Devarim 17:11

[7] Sanhedrin 17a

Photo Credit: http://latimerappleby.com/left-hand-right-hand-communication-breakdown/

Parshas Re'eh - Baseless Beliefs

~ Thoughts on the Parsha ~

Parshas Re'eh

Baseless Beliefs

By: Daniel Listhaus

אֵת כָּל הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לֹא תֹסֵף עָלָיו וְלֹא תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ

                                                                                          

“The entire matter that I command you, you shall guard it to do; you shall not add to it and you shall not subtract from it.”

-Re'eh 13:1

            Rashi[1] explains that when the Torah here commands us not to add to the mitzvos, it means that we are prohibited from adding to the details of the mitzvos themselves, such as bringing a fifth species on Succos with the lulav or adding in a fourth beracha (blessing) to birkas kohanim (the blessing that the kohanim give which is divided into three parts). Presumably we could assume that Rashi would similarly explain that when the passuk (verse) says not to subtract from the mitzvos it means not to, for example, bring three species on Succos or recite only two berachos of birkas kohanim.

            The question we must ask, though, is what compelled Rashi to explain the passuk in this way? Certainly a more obvious explanation of the Torah would be that Hashem gave us 613 mitzvos and we are not allowed to add or subtract from those mitzvos? The words of the passuk sound like they are talking to the person who wants to stand up and declare a new mitzva which would benefit society, to which the Torah is telling him that it is forbidden to add mitzvos. So, why does Rashi explain the passuk as not adding or subtracting to the details of each particular mitzva?

            The S'forno[2] also does not seem to understand the passuk at its face value. Rather, when the Torah writes not to add to the mitzvos, the S'forno comments, “Do not add to the mitzvos because perhaps you will be adding something which is disgusting in the eyes of Hashem. For example, perhaps you may decide to add a new form of worshiping Hashem such as burning children, which is disgusting in the eyes of Hashem.”

            This S'forno seems a bit extreme. He is explaining that the Torah was afraid of people making up their own ways to serve Hashem – such as burning children in fire. Is this really a concern? The S'forno is not dealing with someone looking to serve avodah zarah (idols), but rather an orthodox Jew abiding to the 613 mitzvos but just not feeling it is enough so adds a 614^th mitzvah. What would be so bad with someone choosing to serve Hashem in his own personal way? How is the S'forno addressing this by taking it to an extreme?

            The S'forno continues to explain that when the Torah says not to subtract from the mitzvos it means the following. Sometimes a person could look at a particular mitzva and say that the reason for the mitzva is not applicable and therefore the mitzva is no longer necessary. Sometimes such a claim is general – that the mitzva as a whole no longer applies, and sometimes it is a claim that an individual could make for himself, that for whatever reason the reason behind the mitzva does not apply to him and therefore he is exempt from the mitzva.

            The S'forno continues to mention that this was precisely the mistake that Shlomo HaMelech made. The passuk[3] states, regarding a Jewish king, “And he shall not have too many wives,[4] and his heart shall not turn astray...” The Medrash[5] describes that Shlomo learned this passuk and figured that it did not apply to him. After all, the passuk seems to be saying that the reason a king cannot have too many wives is because the Torah is concerned that it will cause his heart to go astray. Shlomo thought that because of his gift of abundant wisdom he was different from everyone else and therefore felt he could go ahead and marry additional wives.[6] However, as the S'forno writes, this was a big mistake. The Torah forbids us from subtracting mitzvos even if it seems to us that the reason is not applicable.

            This S'forno is also difficult to understand. Shlomo HaMelech read the Torah and its reason for not having too many wives. He made a personal calculation that it was not relevant to him and acted upon that feeling. What did he do wrong? The S'forno is saying that even if we see that the reason does not apply anymore, we should do it anyway. Why? If in fact the reason does not apply, what is the point of playing along and keeping unnecessary restrictions? If the S'forno would say that there is an external reason why one should keep the mitzva, such as not to confuse others to think the mitzva is completely non-existent, or in order that others should not think that such a person is specifically revolting against Hashem, then we could perhaps understand why it would be important to do a mitzva, despite its non-applicable reason. However, the S'forno does not give these answers as the explanation, but rather simply writes that even if it appears that the reason for the mitzva does not apply to you, you must do it anyway. Why is that so?

            In order to approach this, let us take a moment to think about the following. Imagine you were to walk into an ethics class at a university and are immediately swept into a series of thought provoking and interesting questions. You sit in the back and listen as the professor presents a famous question known as the Trolley Problem. There are many versions of the question but the basic gist is the following: There is a trolley out of control speeding down the tracks. Ahead on the tracks lay five people who are tied down, unable to move out of the way. You happen to be standing on the side of the tracks next to a lever. If you were to pull the lever, the trolley would be redirected onto a different set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person lying tied down on that track as well. Therefore, the two options you have are to either do nothing and allow the trolley to continue its course and kill the five people, or pull the lever and divert the trolley onto the other set of tracks where it will only kill the one person. The professor then turns to his class and challenges them: which option do you choose? As you remain observing in the back, you begin to witness the most fascinating debate amongst the students. One person stands up and declares that it is so obvious that you need to pull the lever. After all, how could you allow the five people to die for the sake of a single individual? Suddenly another member of the class jumps up and shouts back, “You mean you think it is better to actively kill someone? Better to just let nature take its course and allow the five people to die than for it to be on your hands that you actively killed the single person on the other track.” Another classmate then stands up and says, “Well I think it should matter who these people are. Perhaps the five people are anyways all sick and elderly people, while the individual on the track happens to be a baby.” Another student then stands up emotionally charged and says, “What difference should it make? Who are you to play the role of God? Maybe the healthy guy will die tomorrow and the sick, elderly people will live until 120!”

            As your head is bouncing back and forth digesting the various arguments and interjections by the professor pointing out the various defined schools of thought, you wonder to yourself what are all these ethics based on? The first student who stood up made a valid point: One should do what is best for the majority. However, without a doubt if you were to ask him why, he would have nothing to respond other than, “Because that is the correct thing to do. It is something that just feels right.” With this approach it is important to keep in mind that if one believes that a moral code is just based on gut feeling and emotions, then one has to be ready to accept the moral code of others based on their personal feelings and emotions. The response of “it just feels right” is arbitrary. Who says that what you think feels right is in fact right? For example, imagine someone who believes that if there is something a person wants for himself, he is ethically permitted to go any distance to get what he wants. Such a person could argue that if someone else has something he is jealous of and wants it, he has the right to demand it from him; and if he refuses, he could even kill for the item he desires. If one were to challenge this person and ask why such a mentality makes sense, he too could respond, “Because it is honestly just something that feels right to me. I was put in this world and it is my job to do whatever it takes to make myself happy.” Despite the two very different approaches to life, these two people have the same reason why they do what they do. Their response is incontestable and could be used by anyone to rationalize any action.

            One of the things we have to think about everyday is the fact that not only must we be grateful to Hashem for creating us, and not only must we thank Him for creating us as humans, we must also thank Him for the fact that He, as Creator of the world did not leave us here alone.[7] He gave us the Torah. The Torah is more than a history book, more than a scroll of rules, and more fundamental than a perspective on life. It is insight into Hashem Himself. Just like in order to optimize a board game, one must read the instruction pamphlet, so too when it comes to knowing how to live, think, and even things as personal as how to feel emotionally, the only way to act and respond correctly is through understanding what Hashem wants from us. This could only be done by someone who is close to Hashem, which is only possible by someone who has spent the time learning His Torah.

            It is known that there are two categories of mitzvos – mishpatim and chukim. Mishpatim refer to the mitzvos which are easy for us to understand. For example, not to steal or kill are things which are obvious to us that they should not be done. Chukim refer to the mitzvos which we cannot begin to fully comprehend. The whole concept of tumah (impurity) and tahara (purity) and especially the applications of chukim such as parah adumah are more than just complex - they are ideas that are way incomprehensible to us.

            However, despite this difference between the two terms, it is important to keep in mind that in reality every single mitzva is a chok (singular for chukim). Even the mitzvos which make sense to us and we think we comprehend, are not things that we should do solely because they make sense to us, nor are they right or wrong based on our personal understanding or emotions. Rather things are only good or bad because

e Hashem declared them as such. For example, the fact that killing is wrong is not just because it feels wrong, rather it is because Hashem declared it as wrong. However, if there would be a time that the Torah would demand someone or a nation to be killed, whether we understand the reason or not, and whether we personally believe that death is deserved or not is completely irrelevant. Everything has its time and place. The person who studies the ways of Hashem through His Torah shel b'chsav (written Torah) and Torah shel ba'al peh understands on a much deeper level what makes things right and wrong using the tools of reason that Hashem gave us on Har Sinai to use.

            Perhaps now we could better appreciate Rashi and the S'forno's explanations on the passuk of not adding or subtracting to the Torah. As mentioned above, Rashi gave examples as to what the Torah means when it says that one could not add to the Torah. He wrote that one cannot add another species to the lulav, esrog, haddas and aravah, or add in a beracha to birkas kohanim. Perhaps Rashi chose this explanation as opposed to simply writing that the Torah gave 613 mitzvos and we cannot add to that number because that would not be completely true. Part of the Torah's system is to leave room for those in-tuned to what Hashem wants to be able to create safety precautions to protect the Torah or create other decrees as they see fit.

            The S'forno too is coming to explain that the Torah is teaching us the following. Even if someone thinks that the thing he is adding is enhancing his avodas Hashem, do not do it without consulting someone who has insight into the ways of Hashem, for perhaps he will be doing something disgusting in the eyes of Hashem such as burning children. The S'forno is not exaggerating; he is simply stating a fact. Indeed one who makes up way of serving Hashem, no matter how good it seems in his eyes, it is repulsive to Hashem. If it does not have roots in the Torah then it is completely baseless like the person who sacrifices children. Although you may think that the two are not even comparable, you must keep in mind that if you are willing to argue that what you feel is good avodas Hashem is valid, then you are also saying that whatever anyone else feels is good avodas Hashem is valid as well. And yes, that baseless argument could rationalize anything – even the burning of children.

            One cannot make up mitzvos based on what he feels is right and wrong. In the end of the day unless one is in-tuned to da'as elyon by thoroughly studying the Torah to the point that one is trained to think, so to speak, like Hashem, one has no right to declare what is good or bad. One cannot just say that because he feels something is right that therefore it must be the case. For, just like the trolly problem, every s'vara (logic) one way will have a counter s'vara against it by someone else who does not share the same feelings and therefore ends up with a completely different moral code. Rather, when it comes to the Torah we must keep in mind that even the mitzvos we think we know the reason for, we really do not and at some level every mitzva we do – even those as basic as not killing or being nice to one another – is a chok, a decree from Hashem. This was Shlomo's mistake. He saw that the Torah specified a reason for why a king should not marry too many wives and he took that at face value.

            As we enter into the month of Elul, may Hashem help us realize that His telling us in the Torah what to do and not to do is the only reason that anything becomes inherently good or evil, and that alone is the only solid base for a belief system with a valid moral code. With this in mind we will be zoche (merit) to a real teshuva (repentance) and a complete kapparah (atonement).

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[1]    Devarim 13:1

[2]    Ibid.

[3]    Devarim 17:17

[4]    See Gemara Sanhedrin 21a. A  king cannot marry more than 18 wives.

[5]    Shemos Rabbah 6:1

[6]    He married 1000 wives!

[7]    See Orchos Tzadikkim: Sha'ar HaZechira

Parshas Eikev - The Bottom Line of Bribery

~ Thoughts on the Parsha ~

Parshas Eikev

The Bottom Line of Bribery

 By: Daniel Listhaus

כִּי ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הוּא אֱלֹקי הָאֱלֹקים וַאֲדֹנֵי הָאֲדֹנִים הָקל הַגָּדֹל הַגִּבֹּר וְהַנּוֹרָא אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשָּׂא פָנִים וְלֹא יִקַּח שֹׁחַד

“For Hashem, your God – He is the God of the powers and the Lord of the lords, the great, mighty, and awesome God, Who does not show favor and does not take a bribe....”

-Eikev 10:17

            In the middle of Moshe’s ultimate speech to the B’nei Yisroel before his death, Moshe reminds them that there is no “cheating the system” because Hashem does not take bribes. Rashi[1] comments that this means that Hashem cannot be appeased with money. However, this Rashi is very hard to understand. Why would the idea even enter one’s mind to try to appease Hashem with money? The whole idea is ridiculous. How could man attempt to bribe Hashem with money?

            The S’forno[2] has a different approach and writes that Moshe was relating the following idea. Imagine a person who is a sinner. He knows that ultimately he will be punished for his sins but he finds it too hard to control himself so does it anyway. However, still uncomfortable with the thought of spending time in gehenom, he reasons that he could just do more mitzvos and as a result diminish the punishment of his aveiros (sins). In order to counter such a thought, Moshe rabbeinu taught that Hashem does not take bribes. As the S’forno continues to write based on the gemara[3], “a mitzva does not extinguish an aveirah.” Therefore one should not think that if one sins he could dampen his punishment by performing mitzvos, for those are calculated on a separate scale. Rather, the only way to lessen the punishment of aveiros is by doing teshuvah.

            The Maharal, in Gur Aryeh,[4] explains for Rashi that of course there would be no hava amina (thought) to think that it would be possible to offer money to Hashem to appease him because there is nothing that we would be doing. Even declaring that Hashem already has all the money in the world would be a gross understatement. Wealth is a physical concept; Hashem is fundamentally above any gashmiyus ideas. Rather, what Rashi must mean is that one might think that one can play within the guidelines that Hashem set forth for us of connecting to him through offering karbanos (sacrifices) and donating to the Beis Ha’Mikdash and that by doing so could appease Hashem to dampen one’s load of aveiros. In order to rebut such a thought, Moshe reminded B’nei Yisroel that each individual is responsible for his or her actions and that an appeasement of being a “goody-goody” to be more generous in offering better karbanos and more sponsorship opportunities might get one some bonus mitzvos, but does not do anything to lighten the load of one’s averios.

            Using the Maharal’s explanation, Rashi and the S’forno seem to be saying the same thing. One is responsible for his actions and just because one decides to do more mitzvos does not negate the fact that he or she did past aveiros.

Interestingly, though, the gemara that the S’forno is referring to actually uses a slightly different terminology. The gemara does not say that performing mitzvos has no effect on one’s aveiros. All that the gemara mentions is that aveiros have the power to dampen the potency of one’s mitzvos. How does the S’forno see from this gemara that mitzvos do not have the power to dampen aveiros? Perhaps they dampen each other? Perhaps the gemara means that each individual has a virtual basket where all his mitzvos and aveiros get stored and calculated and that the system is such that for some mitzvos he gets rewarded and for some aveiros he gets punished, while some just cancel each other out and the s’char v’onesh (reward and punishment) consequence will fully depend if the sum is positive or negative? Why should it be that aveiros dampen mitzvos but mitzvos cannot dampen aveiros? It does not make sense and seems quite unfair! Additionally, why would this be referred to as bribery? Shouldn’t this precisely be how the system works? Hashem should look down and tally up our mitzvos and aveiros and allow them to balance each other out similar to how the system works on Rosh Hashanah as part of the calculation in determining who should live on to the upcoming year. So why is this called bribery and even we could explain why it deserves such a title, how could we understand the one-way relationship of aveiros having the power to dampen mitzvos but not the other way around?

            Earlier in the parsha[5], Rashi[6] explains that Moshe warned the B’nei Yisroel to be just as meticulous regarding safeguarding the “light mitzvos” as the “heavy ones” and not tread on them, so to speak, as so many people do. However, it is hard to understand why this is such a serious matter. After all, imagine someone who is extremely careful when it comes to keeping Shabbos properly, but happens not to care too much about performing the mitzva of shiluach ha’kein (sending away the mother bird before taking its egg)[7] correctly. What’s the big deal? He is keeping Shabbos perfectly and is meticulous when it comes to all the “major league” mitzvos he just is not so careful with some of the lighter mitzvos. If he is scoring well with the big mitzvos isn’t that what is more important?

            The S’forno[8] comments that Hashem commanded us to keep all the mitzvos and in return he keeps with us bris v’chesed – his treaty and kindness. However just doing the mitzvos is not enough. We are obligated to perform the mitzvos with the proper intentions doing them out of love for Hashem as opposed to for personal ulterior motives or even for the purpose of receiving reward in the world to come. This is an idea we find in the mishnayos as well. The mishna[9] cites Antignus who teaches that our approach to performing mitzvos should not be like servants who work in order to receive reward, but rather be like servants who work even without receiving reward. In other words, when we perform mitzvos the reason we do so should, on a highest level, be solely out of love for Hashem. Not because of the eternal reward we will receive, not for the physical consequences we benefit from, and not even solely for the reasons that are described in the Torah. Rather, ultimately our mindset should be that every mishpat at its core is a chok and the reason we follow the Torah and keep the mitzvos is because that is what Hashem commanded.

The game of adding and subtracting points based on mitzvos and aveiros is a physical game – one which plays a role in determining if an individual will live longer, and whether the world in general may continue. However, on a deeper level, in the world of s’char v’onesh, it does not work like that at all. An aveirah is more than a red minus one mark; it is a glaring symbol of rebellion against the King and raises a red flag to reevaluate the authenticity of the mitzvos performed. Doing more mitzvos does not negate the fact that an aveirah was done. The opposite of an aveirah is not a mitzvah per se, it is teshuva. An aveirah means rebellion and teshuva could remedy that; doing mitzvos will allow one to get s’char, but does not make light of the fact that one rebelled against the King.

With this in mind we could better understand the first passuk as well as the mishna in avos[10]. Every single mitzvah deserves the same amount of seriousness because every mitzvah is a direct commandment from Hashem. Therefore transgressing even on what we may perceive as the slightest of mitzvos is really at its core a demonstration of utter rebellion.

The s’char that one receives from doing mitzvos is beyond comprehension. As the gemara[11] relates in the name of Rebbe Yaakov, it is not possible to receive the reward from a mitzvah in this world. The Michtav Mei’Eliyahu[12] writes that this is true even of the “smallest” mitzvos. Mitzvos performed in this world are fulfillments of Hashem’s ruchniyus commandments, the rewards that are reaped from their fulfillment are so great that all of the money and pleasures on this world from the day it was created until now cannot compensate. It is this understanding itself of the greatness of even the smallest of mitzvos which answers why aveiros diminish mitzvos and not the other way around. Even the transgression of the smallest aveirah translates directly into an audacious act of treason. One who does an aveirah sheds light on where he is at in terms of his loyalty, so to speak, to Hashem. The way to prove loyalty is not to point to the good deeds one has done or will promise to do, for those themselves could be called into question as being done for ulterior motives. Rather, the only way to counter the seriousness of even the smallest aveirah and to diminish its consequences is by doing teshuva.

Bribery is a demonstration of not caring about one’s improper actions or the legal processes that they demand, and instead is an attempt to beat the system by diverting the judge’s attention to other good deeds or future promises. Hashem does not accept even the best of bribes. Pointing to past mitzvos, giving one’s best animals as karbanos, or doubling one’s contributions to the Beis Ha’Mikdash with the hope of being able to shirk his accountability through appeasement is not the proper response. Only the gift of teshuva is strong enough to undo the damage of disobedience by sincerely apologizing for the aveirah done and accepting upon oneself to make the extra effort that it does not happen again.

With the month of Ellul approaching may we take the time to look back at our actions and not just make the effort to increase our mitzvos so that we merit a good din, but to also work on teshuva to undo the damage we have done with our aveiros.

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[1] Rashi Devarim 10:17

[2] Ibid.

[3] Sotah 21a

[4] Devarim 10:17

[5] Devarim 7:12

[6] Ibid.

[7] This is what the Da’as Zekainim M’ba’alei Tosfos (Devarim 7:12) as well as the Maharal (Avos 2:1) offer as an example of a “light mitzvah” based on a memra (statement) from Rebbe Shimon ben Yochai.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Avos 3:1

[10] Avos 2:1

[11] Kiddushin 39b

[12] Michtav Mei’Eliyahu 1:1